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NOTES
AVOIDING DOUBLE RECOVERY:
ASSESSING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN
PRIVATE WAGE AND HOUR ACTIONS UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND
THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW
Alexander J. Callen*
Wage and hour cases are common in New York, yet courts calculate
damages inconsistently when plaintiffs pursue their unpaid wages under
both federal and state law. Overlapping provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law both authorize private actions
for the recovery of certain unpaid wages, and each also provides an
additional 100 percent of the unpaid wages as liquidated damages unless
the employer establishes a good-faith defense. Given these similarities,
New York wage and hour cases regularly flirt with the double recovery
doctrine, which prevents plaintiffs from receiving duplicative awards.
Historically, courts in the Second Circuit have been split over whether
awarding both sets of liquidated damages offends double recovery. An old
New York statute authorized only 25 percent of the unpaid wages as
liquidated damages and allowed them only if an employee could
demonstrate that the employer’s violation was willful. Based upon the old
law’s scienter requirement and upon its legislative history, courts
considered the state provision punitive in purpose, as opposed to the
federal provision, which is compensatory. Consequently, some courts
reasoned that because each provision served a different purpose, the
awards were not duplicative. Others disagreed.
Although the New York Labor Law’s current liquidated damages
provision bears little resemblance to its predecessor, some courts continue
to apply analyses of the old statute to the new one. This Note analyzes the
effects that amendments enacted in 2009 and 2010 should have upon the
preexisting split and contends that neither the current statutory text nor its
legislative history conclusively supports characterizing the state provision
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exclusively as either compensatory or punitive. Instead, the evidence
suggests a dual purpose. Since the awards overlap, courts can only avoid
double recovery by awarding one set of liquidated damages.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2007, the Saigon Grill in New York City employed
thirty-six Chinese immigrants as delivery workers.1 None spoke English
fluently, and none had received more than a “rudimentary” education in
China.2 They routinely worked thirteen-hour shifts, often without meal
breaks, for as little as $1.60 an hour.3 Thanks to federal and state wage and
hour laws, their lawsuit resulted in a multimillion dollar award for back pay
and damages.4
The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 19385 (FLSA) authorizes
employees to file private actions to recover unpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation, plus an additional sum equaling 100 percent of
those underpaid wages6 as mandatory liquidated damages.7 An employer
may avoid liability for liquidated damages only upon demonstrating that it
acted in “good faith” and had “reasonable grounds” for believing that its
behavior did not violate the FLSA.8 Currently, the New York Labor Law’s
(NYLL) relevant provisions parallel the FLSA’s.9
1. Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 245, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
2. Id. at 248.
3. See id. at 249–51; ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT,
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN
AMERICA’S CITIES 8 (2009), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/Broken
LawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Chuck Bennett, It’s the Fall of ‘Saigon’: Eatery Staff Wins
$4M in ‘Viet’ War, N.Y. POST (Oct. 22, 2008, 4:08 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
regional/item_0T02j6LsKBE6KITzyyTUsO.
4. See Saigon Grill, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 267–81; BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 8;
Bennett, supra note 3.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
6. Although both statutes define “wage,” see 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§§ 190(1), 651(7) (McKinney Supp. 2013), this Note uses the term colloquially to reference
an employee’s compensation for labor or services. This Note employs more specific terms,
such as “minimum wage,” “overtime compensation,” or “regular rate,” in accordance with
statutory definitions, indicated as appropriate, infra.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing private actions and specifying the recovery
available); see also id. § 206 (establishing a federal minimum wage); id. § 207(a)(1)
(limiting workweek unless employee receives “one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed” for hours exceeding forty).
8. See id. § 260; 29 C.F.R. § 790.16, .22; see also Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps.
Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142
(2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003); Reich v.
S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); 1 THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT 1-20 to -21 (Ellen C. Kearns ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter KEARNS]; 2 id.
at 18-163.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198(1-a), 663(1) (authorizing private actions for
recovery of certain unpaid wages and overtime compensation, plus an additional 100 percent
of those underpaid wages as mandatory liquidated damages unless an employer establishes a
good-faith defense); see also id. § 652 (providing for the state minimum wage); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.1 (2012) (same); id. § 142-2.2 (providing for overtime
compensation “at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate in the
manner [of the FLSA]”). Article 6 of the NYLL (sections 190 to 199-D) is the state’s Wage
Payment Act, while article 19 (sections 650 to 665) is the state’s Minimum Wage Act.
Whether article 6 or article 19 applies depends upon the facts of a particular case. See Myers
v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 368 (2011). The
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Such conformity, however, did not always exist. An old New York
statute enacted in 1967 (1967 Version) authorized employees to recover
their unpaid wages, plus an additional 25 percent of those wages as
liquidated damages if they could demonstrate that their employer’s violation
was willful.10 Divergent interpretations of that statute created a split within
the Second Circuit over whether liquidated damages could be awarded
under both the federal and state statutes for the same underpaid wage or
whether such an award would constitute an impermissible double recovery.
Some courts reasoned that double recovery was avoided because the two
liquidated damages provisions served different purposes—the FLSA’s
compensatory and the NYLL’s punitive—while others reasoned that only a
single award was appropriate because each provision remedied the same
harm or served the same practical purpose.11
In 2009, an amendment (2009 Amendment) removed the willfulness
requirement.12 In 2010, another amendment (2010 Amendment) increased
the amount of liquidated damages from 25 percent of the unpaid wages to
100 percent.13 Despite the statutory overhaul, district courts in the Second
Circuit have not seriously reassessed their positions, and some continue
applying interpretations of the 1967 Version to the new statutory text.14
Consequently, questions remain as to whether a plaintiff may recover
liquidated damages under both statutes for the same underpaid wage. The
answer depends on whether courts will construe the current statute, based
upon its text and legislative history, as exclusively compensatory or

NYLL’s statutory remedies, including attorney’s fees and liquidated damages, exceed the
damages available for common law breach of contract claims. See Gottlieb v. Kenneth D.
Laub & Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 34 (N.Y. 1993). The statutory awards require substantive
statutory violations and are not recoverable for common law breach of contract claims. See
id. at 32–34. Because these two articles contain comparable liquidated damages provisions,
for convenience this Note discusses only article 6’s hereafter. Compare N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 198(1-a), with id. § 663(1).
10. See Act of Apr. 18, 1967, ch. 310, § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1014, 1014.
11. Compare, e.g., Wicaksono v. XYZ 48 Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3635, 2011 WL 2022644,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) (surveying the split and awarding both FLSA and NYLL
liquidated damages on same underlying wage according to a “different purposes” theory),
and Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Since the
two awards serve different purposes, plaintiffs may recover both.”), with Greathouse v. JHS
Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012) (surveying
split and awarding liquidated damages under the statute providing the greater recovery,
because both remedies address the same harm), and Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (awarding liquidated damages under
the statute providing the greater recovery, because both remedies serve the same practical
purpose).
12. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086.
13. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446.
14. See, e.g., Garcia v. Giorgio’s Brick Oven & Wine Bar, No. 11 Civ. 4689, 2012 WL
3339220, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (relying on cases interpreting the 1967 Version
for a “different purposes” analysis applied to the current statutory text), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3893537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Angamarca v. Pita
Grill 7 Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7777, 2012 WL 3578781, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (same).
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punitive in purpose. If left unaddressed, this issue threatens to perpetuate a
practice of inconsistent awards in wage and hour cases.
Consistency in wage and hour cases is increasingly important, because
headline-grabbing cases like Saigon Grill15 form only the tip of the iceberg
when it comes to the scourge of wage and hour violations plaguing New
York and the nation. America’s low-wage workers regularly suffer
minimum wage and overtime compensation violations.16 In 2008, the
National Employment Law Project (NELP) surveyed 4,387 workers in lowwage industries in major American cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York.17 The survey revealed that 26 percent of respondents were
paid less than the required minimum wage.18 Further, 25 percent of
respondents reported working overtime, 76 percent of whom were paid less
than the required overtime rate.19 Moreover, the average overtime worker
accumulated eleven hours of overtime per week that were “either underpaid
or not paid at all.”20 New York City’s figures parallel the national data.21
The harms of wage and hour violations extend far beyond those inflicted
upon individual workers—they also ripple throughout the economy.22
Wage underpayment deprives communities of business- and job-sustaining
spending, limits economic development, reduces tax revenues, and burdens
social safety nets.23 It creates unfair competition for honest employers and
drives down other workers’ wages.24 Wage and hour violations also impact

15. See Saigon Grill, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 240; Bennett, supra note 3.
16. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 19–21.
17. See id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2, 21.
20. Id. at 2, 22.
21. A 2008 NELP survey of 1,432 low-wage workers in New York City indicated that
21 percent of respondents were paid less than the minimum wage; 36 percent of respondents
worked overtime, 77 percent of whom were paid less than the required overtime rate; and the
average overtime worker accumulated thirteen hours of unpaid or underpaid overtime per
week. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKING WITHOUT
LAWS: A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 2, 18
(2010), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/990687e422dcf919d3_h6m6bf6ki.pdf; see also
Annette Bernhardt, Wages Belong to the Workers, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Nov. 24, 2010, at
A11, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 37 (discussing NELP’s New York City
survey).
22. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 50.
23. See id.; see also Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act of 1997, ch. 605, § 1, 1997 N.Y.
Laws 3392, 3392–93 (“Low-wage workers who are unpaid or underpaid cannot support
themselves and their families, and may be forced to rely on scarce public resources.”).
24. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 50; see also Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act of
1997, § 1 (describing the impact violations have on New York’s economy). Some
businesses even attempt to substitute “unpaid interns” for paid employees. See Steven
Greenhouse, Jobs Few, Grads Flock to Unpaid Internships, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, at A1
(describing the market for postgraduate unpaid internships); Jeffrey W. Rubin & Michael
Berkowitz, Risky Business: Using Unpaid Interns, 146 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) I-1 (2012)
(outlining the ways that employers can structure unpaid internships to reduce the risks of
wage and hour litigation); Steven Greenhouse, The Uses and Misuses of Unpaid Internships,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/the-
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the legal community. Since 2008, the number of federal wage and hour
cases has exploded, increasing by approximately 30 percent nationally.25
Wage and hour cases now represent one of the “fastest growing areas of
litigation,” and “mill” specialist firms have emerged across the country.26
The trend shows no signs of easing, due to an unbalanced labor market
exacerbated by the recent economic downturn.27 Although job losses were
widespread during the recession, they hit mid-wage occupations the hardest
and pushed many workers into low-wage positions.28 Post-recession job
growth has concentrated on low-wage occupations, growing 2.7 times faster
than mid-wage and high-wage positions.29 Compounding these effects,
low-wage jobs account for “eight out of the top 10 occupations projected to
grow the most by 2018.”30
This Note analyzes the effects that the 2009 and 2010 Amendments
should have upon the preexisting split over whether a plaintiff may recover
both federal and state liquidated damages for the same underpaid wage.
Part I introduces the FLSA and NYLL’s relevant provisions; key concepts

uses-and-misuses-of-unpaid-internships/?ref=stevengreenhouse
(chronicling
the
“considerable dismay” with certain postgraduate unpaid internships).
25. See Mitchell Hartman, More Overtime Hours, Less Overtime Pay?, MARKETPLACE
(July 12, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/more-overtime-hoursless-overtime-pay.
26. See Christopher M. Pardo, The Cost of Doing Business: Mitigating Increasing
Recession Wage and Hour Risks While Promoting Economic Recovery, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L.
1, 10–13 (2010) (explaining the various reasons for the increased frequency of wage and
hour litigation); see also Simona Covel, Businesses Face Threat of Lawsuits from Laid-Off
Employees, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/independentstreet/
2009/02/18/businesses-face-threat-of-lawsuits-from-laid-off-employees/; Alexander Eichler,
Unpaid Overtime: Wage and Hour Lawsuits Have Skyrocketed in the Last Decade,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/
wage-hour-lawsuits_n_1556484.html; Martha Graybow, Tough Times Spur Laid-Off
Workers To Sue, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2008, 9:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/news
One/idUSN0640986220081111; Sally Roberts, Time Is Big Bucks, Class-Action Wage
Lawsuits Show, WORKFORCE (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.workforce.com/article/20071221/
NEWS01/312219994.
27. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE LOW-WAGE RECOVERY AND GROWING
INEQUALITY 1 (2012), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Job_Creation/LowWage
Recovery2012.pdf?nocdn=1; Catherine Rampell, Majority of Jobs Added in the Recovery
Pay Low Wages, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at B1.
28. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1. Low-wage occupations
constituted 21 percent of job losses, mid-wage 60 percent, and high-wage 19 percent. See id.;
see also Rampell, supra note 27 (discussing studies about the “polarization” of skills and
wages). NELP defines “lower-wage occupations” as those with median hourly wages of
$7.69 to $13.83, “mid-wage occupations” as $13.84 to $21.13, and “higher-wage
occupations” as $21.14 to $54.55. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 2.
29. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1. Low-wage occupations
constituted 58 percent of job growth, mid-wage 22 percent, and high-wage 20 percent. See
id.; see also Rampell, supra note 27.
30. Bernhardt, supra note 21, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 37
(describing these occupations as “home care and child care workers, dishwashers, food
prep[aration] workers, construction workers, cashiers, laundry workers, garment workers,
security guards and janitors”); see also Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Governor
David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 56.
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including double recovery, statutory multiple damages, and principles of
New York statutory construction; and finally the leading judicial
interpretations of the FLSA and NYLL’s liquidated damages provisions’
respective purposes. Part II presents the preexisting split within the Second
Circuit concerning awards made under the FLSA and the 1967 Version and
discusses the effects of and purposes for the 2009 and 2010 Amendments.
Finally, Part III argues that plaintiffs should be limited to one liquidated
damages award to avoid double recovery because the current NYLL
liquidated damages provision is both compensatory and punitive in purpose,
thus overlapping with the FLSA.
I. BASIC ELEMENTS: THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, THE NEW YORK
LABOR LAW, AND DOUBLE RECOVERY
This part begins with an introduction to the relevant FLSA and NYLL
liquidated damages provisions before proceeding to a general discussion of
related legal concepts, including the double recovery doctrine, the
respective purposes of compensatory and punitive damages, the various
roles that statutory multiple damages play, and the basic tenets of New
York statutory construction. This part concludes with the leading judicial
interpretations characterizing the FLSA’s liquidated damages as
compensatory and the 1967 Version’s as punitive.
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
The FLSA and NYLL have a lot in common. This section sketches the
basic framework of each statute’s liquidated damages provisions.
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA is a comprehensive federal statute governing a wide array of
employment matters.31 Among its most basic provisions are 29 U.S.C.
§ 206, establishing the federal minimum wage, and § 207, requiring
overtime compensation at 150 percent of an employee’s regular rate.32
Such measures are intended to protect vulnerable low-wage workers from
economic distress while promoting their health and general well-being.33
31. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
32. See id. §§ 206, 207(a)(1). An employee’s “regular rate” should not be confused with
the “minimum wage” rate. Compare id. § 206 (specifying the minimum wage rate), with id.
§ 207(e) (defining “regular rate” for purposes of overtime compensation calculations).
33. See id. § 202(a) (declaring Congress’s intent to protect the “minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers”); see also United
States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945) (observing Congress’s intent to protect
workers “from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare necessities
of life and from long hours of work injurious to health”); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v.
Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s message
emphasizing the FLSA’s provision of “[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” and of
protections from the “evil” of “overwork” and “underpay”); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (citing Congress’s concern over the “maintenance of the minimum
standards of living necessary for health and general well-being” of workers).
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Section 216(b) authorizes private actions to safeguard the FLSA’s
reforms.34 In such actions, employers that have violated § 206 or § 207
“shall be liable” not only for unpaid wages but also “an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages” (i.e., 100 percent liquidated damages).35
These liquidated damages are automatic and do not require an employee to
demonstrate that an employer’s violation arose willfully or due to any other
culpable state of mind.36
Until 1947, liquidated damages awards were mandatory in all successful
actions brought under § 216(b).37 At that time, Congress, reacting to early
U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting § 216, enacted the Portal-to-Portal
Pay Act38 (PPA), which provided employers with opportunities to avoid
liquidated damages in certain situations.39 First, the PPA allowed for the
compromise of claims “if there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount
payable,” as well as for the waiver of liquidated damages.40 Next, the PPA
set a two-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims, since none had
existed previously.41 Finally, the PPA gave courts broad discretion to
reduce or deny liquidated damages where an employer demonstrates that it
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing private actions under § 216(b) and official actions
under § 216(c) for violations of § 206 or § 207).
35. Id. § 216(b)–(c); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-160. Section 216(b)
provides, in part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
be, and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . . An action to
recover the liability prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
employees similarly situated.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
37. See 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-160; see also Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc.,
No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).
38. Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 251–262).
39. See id. One of those early cases was Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697
(1945), in which a bank, realizing it had improperly compensated an employee’s overtime,
subsequently paid the employee in full and obtained a release from the employee’s FLSA
claims. See id. at 700. Notwithstanding the release, the employee sued to recover FLSA
liquidated damages. See id. The Court held that an overriding public interest inherent in the
FLSA prohibited employees from relinquishing their rights to liquidated damages, so such a
waiver was “absolutely void.” See id. at 713–14; see also 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-18; 2
id. at 18-160.
40. See § 3(a)–(b), 61 Stat. at 86; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-20. Compromised claims
may not yield sums less than statutory minimum wage and overtime compensation rates
require. See 29 U.S.C. § 253; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-20; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–
207.
41. The PPA enacted a two-year statute of limitations. See § 6(a), 61 Stat. at 87–88;
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1988); 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at
1-21. A 1966 amendment extended the PPA’s limitations period to three years if a claim
arose from a “willful” violation. See Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, tit. VI,
§ 601(b), 80 Stat. 830, 844 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 255); McLaughlin, 486 U.S.
at 131–32; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-21.
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acted in “good faith” and had “reasonable grounds” for believing that its
behavior did not violate the FLSA.42 Establishing the good-faith defense
requires demonstrating affirmative steps taken to ascertain and comply with
the FLSA.43 Thus, ignorance and negligence are inadequate defenses.44
The employer’s burden is “difficult” to meet and must be met by “plain and
substantial evidence.”45 Consequently, “[d]ouble damages are the norm,
single damages the exception.”46
2. The New York Labor Law
Like the FLSA, the NYLL governs a wide array of employment matters.
Many of its provisions parallel the FLSA’s, such as those establishing a
minimum wage47 and requiring overtime compensation at 150 percent of an
employee’s regular rate.48 Further, section 198(1-a) authorizes private
enforcement actions, in which an underpaid employee shall recover unpaid
wages plus an “additional amount as liquidated damages equal to one
hundred percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due.”49
Finally, an employer can avoid the NYLL’s automatic liquidated damages
upon proving a good-faith basis for believing that the underpayment
complied with the law.50 Only recently, however, has such great
conformity between the two liquidated damages provisions arisen.
The relevant evolution of section 198 dates back at least to 1921, when
New York passed a comprehensive set of labor laws, some of which

42. See § 11, 61 Stat. at 89; 29 C.F.R. § 790.16, .22; see also Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health
& Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172
F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
2003); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); 1 KEARNS,
supra note 8, at 1-21; 2 id. at 18-163. Section 260 provides, in part:
In any action . . . to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime
compensation, or liquidated damages . . . if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith
and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a
violation . . . the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages
or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of
this title.
29 U.S.C. § 260.
43. See Barfield, 537 F.3d at 150–51 (citing Herman, 172 F.3d at 142 and Reich, 121
F.3d at 71).
44. See Reich, 121 F.3d at 71 (“‘Good faith’ . . . requires more than ignorance of the
prevailing law or uncertainty about its development. It requires that an employer first take
active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FLSA and then move to comply with them.”).
45. Id.
46. Id. (alteration in original).
47. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney Supp. 2013), and
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.1 (2012).
48. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 160, and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.2.
49. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); see also supra note 9
and accompanying text.
50. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a).
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governed the payment of wages.51 Article 6, entitled “Payment of Wages,”
provided for a fifty dollar civil penalty, payable to the state, for the failure
of a “corporation or joint-stock association” to pay its employees’ wages.52
Subsequently, the legislature enacted a series of amendments, which
gradually broadened the provision’s scope to a wider variety of employers
and employees.53
Acts passed in 1966 and 1967, however, marked dramatic departures
from the simple fifty-dollar civil penalty traditionally paid into state
coffers.54 In 1966, the New York State Department of Labor (NYDOL)
sponsored the recodification of article 6.55 The language governing the
fifty-dollar civil penalty was moved from section 198 to section 197, which
retained the heading “Civil penalty,”56 and the new section 198, labeled
“Costs, remedies,” provided that a prevailing employee “may” recover “in
addition to ordinary costs, a reasonable sum, not exceeding fifty dollars for
expenses which may be taxed as costs.”57 One year later, New York added
section 198(1-a), which required employers to pay employees who
prevailed in court an additional 25 percent of unpaid wages as “liquidated
damages” for “willful” violations of the state’s wage and hour laws.58
The 1967 Version’s language remained unchanged for decades until
2009, when New York eliminated the willfulness requirement and replaced
it with a presumption that liquidated damages are available unless the
employer establishes a good-faith defense.59 Shortly after enacting the
2009 Amendment, New York passed the 2010 Amendment as part of the
51. Act of Mar. 9, 1921, ch. 50, §§ 195–198, 1921 N.Y. Laws 132, 165–66.
52. Id. § 198, 1921 N.Y. Laws at 166. Section 198 of the 1921 statute provided:
If a corporation or joint-stock association, its lessee or other person carrying on the
business thereof, shall fail to pay the wages of all its employees, as provided in this
article, it shall forfeit to the people of the state the sum of fifty dollars for each
such failure, to be recovered by the commissioner in a civil action.
Id.
53. See Act of June 14, 1965, ch. 354, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1111, 1111–12 (expanding
to include employers who “differentiate in rate of pay because of sex”); Act of Apr. 14,
1944, ch. 793, § 1, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1755, 1756 (expanding to include employers who
“discriminate in rate of pay”); Act of May 21, 1934, ch. 745, § 1, 1934 N.Y. Laws 1520,
1520–21 (expanding to include violations by “person[s]” or “copartnership[s]”).
54. Act of Apr. 18, 1967, ch. 310, § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1014, 1014; Act of June 14,
1966, ch. 548, § 2, 1966 N.Y. Laws 1293, 1298.
55. See 1966 N.Y. Laws at 1293 n.*; Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (June 3, 1966),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1966, ch. 548, at 4–5; see also Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub &
Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 31–32 (N.Y. 1993).
56. § 2, 1966 N.Y. Laws at 1298.
57. Id.
58. § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws at 1014. The 1967 amendment created section 198(1-a), which
provided:
In any action instituted upon a wage claim by an employee or the commissioner in
which the employee prevails, the court shall allow such employee reasonable
attorney’s fees and, upon a finding that the employer’s failure to pay the wage
required by this article was willful, an additional amount as liquidated damages
equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due.
Id.
59. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086.
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Wage Theft Prevention Act of 201060 (WTPA).61 The WTPA increased
penalties for certain violations of the state’s labor laws, and it required
employers to provide employees with certain notifications related to their
work and pay.62 The WTPA also amended section 198(1-a) by increasing
the amount of liquidated damages recoverable in a private action from 25
percent of unpaid wages to 100 percent.63
B. Double Recovery and Damages
After explaining the double recovery doctrine, this section discusses
compensatory and punitive damages, which are two types of damages
available at law. Understanding the role that each category plays is
essential when determining the nature or purpose of a statutory multiple
damages provision, as described toward the end of this subsection.
1. Double Recovery
The potential for double recovery inevitably arises in New York wage
and hour cases when plaintiffs allege violations of both the FLSA and
NYLL. The FLSA has a two-year statute of limitations that expands to
three years for willful violations.64 The NYLL, on the other hand, has a
six-year statute of limitations, regardless of willfulness.65 When a
prevailing plaintiff claims both federal and state damages arising from back
pay accrued during the overlapping two- to three-year period, courts must
determine whether to award damages under the federal statute, the state
statute, or both.
As the Supreme Court has declared, “courts can and should preclude
double recovery.”66 The double recovery doctrine restricts a plaintiff to a
single recovery for a single injury, even if the plaintiff pleads and tries
multiple or alternative legal theories of recovery.67 Thus, if a federal claim
60. ch. 564, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446.
61. See id. § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws at 1450.
62. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN.
429–30 (addressing the controversy over WTPA’s notice requirements). See generally 2010
N.Y. Laws at 1446–58.
63. See § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws at 1450.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(3) (McKinney Supp. 2013).
66. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the
Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980)); see also Phelan v. Local 305 of the United
Ass’n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff may not recover
twice for the same injury.”); Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642,
649 (2d Cir. 1989); Barrington v. New York, 806 F. Supp. 2d 730, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“‘It
has been broadly stated that judicial policy forestalls a double recovery for an injury.’”
(quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 434 N.Y.S.2d 437, 443 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1980))); 1 DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at 2–3 (2d ed. 1993).
67. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1389 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “double recovery” as a
“judgment that erroneously awards damages twice for the same loss, based on two different
theories of recovery”); see also Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1459–60 (10th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by TW Telecom Holdings Inc. v. Carolina Internet
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and a state claim arise from the same injury and seek the same relief,
damages awarded under both theories would constitute a double recovery.68
In the absence of punitive damages, a plaintiff can recover no more than the
loss actually suffered, because a larger award would produce a windfall.69
That said, compensatory awards for multiple injuries stemming from a
single act or omission do not offend double recovery, provided they do not
encompass duplicative elements or exceed the aggregate harm caused.70
To illustrate, both the FLSA and NYLL provide for the full recovery of
unpaid overtime compensation.71 Although these statutes overlap, courts
will not permit plaintiffs to recover those wages twice, because doing so
would award a windfall.72
The doctrine’s application, however, is less straightforward where
liquidated damages are involved. In addition to the underlying wage, both
the FLSA and NYLL provide for multiple damages as liquidated
damages.73 Whether prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to both sets of
liquidated damages depends upon whether each is considered compensatory
or punitive in nature.74 Compensatory and punitive damages perform
different functions, but are typically awarded together.75 Since awards
serving different functions are not duplicative, their combination does not
offend double recovery.76
Ltd., 661 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 2011); Phelan, 973 F.2d at 1063; Ostano Commerzanstalt, 880
F.2d at 649.
68. See 2 ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK: CIVIL § 79:3, at 502 (2012).
69. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 1389 (defining “double recovery”
as a “[r]ecovery by a party of more than the maximum recoverable loss that the party has
sustained”); id. at 1738 (defining “windfall” as “[a]n unanticipated benefit, usu. in the form
of a profit and not caused by the recipient”); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 1.1, at 4
(describing punitive damages as “noncompensatory” damages). For a discussion of “actual
damages,” see infra Part I.B.2.
70. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 658 (1915)
(“Although originating in the same wrongful act or neglect . . . [a decedent’s pain and
suffering and a beneficiary’s pecuniary losses] are quite distinct . . . . One begins where the
other ends, and a recovery upon both in the same action is not a double recovery for a single
wrong, but a single recovery for a double wrong.”); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 1.1, at 3 (“[A]
plaintiff can have more than one remedy so long as the total does not provide more than one
complete compensation or one complete restitution.”).
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 2013); see
also Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 556 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
that the NYLL mandates overtime pay in the same manner as the FLSA); Reiseck v.
Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (same).
72. See, e.g., Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 262 n.44 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); see also Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-148 (observing that “courts have
consistently held that the recovery of the same compensatory damages under both the
[FLSA] and a state regime is impermissible”).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a).
74. For a discussion of the split within the Second Circuit on this issue, see infra Part II.
75. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); see also
Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
76. See Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 649 (2d Cir.
1989); see also Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999)
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2. Compensatory Damages, Prejudgment Interest, and Liquidated Damages
Compensatory damages redress the actual losses a plaintiff has
suffered.77 They are intended to make the plaintiff whole again, restoring
the position that would have been occupied had an injury never occurred.78
Compensatory damages are limited to the amount a plaintiff actually lost,
because a plaintiff should not receive a windfall or profit from an injury.79
Prejudgment interest is a type of compensatory damage, because it is an
equitable award that compensates plaintiffs for the lost use of money during
a period preceding the entry of judgment.80 It represents part of a plaintiff’s
actual damages and is designed to make the plaintiff whole.81 In federal
actions, prejudgment interest awards are typically discretionary.82 Usually,
(awarding both state liquidated damages and state prejudgment interest on the same
underpaid wage, because each award serves a different purpose); Phelan v. Local 305 of the
United Ass’n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (“When a plaintiff
receives a payment from one source for an injury, defendants are entitled to a credit of that
amount against any judgment obtained by the plaintiff as long as both payments represent
common damages”); 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-148 to -149 (“[S]everal courts have held
that an employer is subject to both state and federal remedial measures that the court finds
are not duplicative.”).
77. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (defining “actual damages” as
“[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages
that repay actual losses” and as “compensatory damages”); see also Campbell, 538 U.S. at
416; Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977).
78. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (defining “compensatory
damages” as “[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss
suffered” and as “actual damages”); see also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416.
79. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 118 (2012).
80. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (“[I]nterest is
customarily allowed as compensation for delay in payment.”); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc.,
840 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting prejudgment interest in the absence of FLSA
liquidated damages); Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Prejudgment interest obviously serves the compensatory purpose by making up for the delay in
receiving the money, during which time the employees were denied its use, and by partially
offsetting the reduction in the value of the delayed wages caused by inflation.”); see also
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(b) (McKinney 2007) (specifying that prejudgment interest should be
calculated “from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed” or when damage
was incurred); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.6(1)–(2), at 333, 346 (discussing various
potential starting points for prejudgment interest calculations).
81. See Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988); see also, e.g.,
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989) (“[P]rejudgment interest
traditionally has been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff.”); Loeffler v. Frank,
486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988); West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1987);
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1983).
82. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Endico Potatoes,
Inc. v. CIT Grp./Factoring, Inc., 67 F.3d 1063, 1071–72 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts exercising
such discretion weigh numerous factors, such as “(i) the need to fully compensate the
wronged party for actual damages suffered, (ii) considerations of fairness and the relative
equities of the award, (iii) the remedial purpose of the statute involved, and/or (iv) such other
general principles as are deemed relevant by the court.” Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering four factors enumerated in SEC v. First
Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1476 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also SEC v. Milligan, 436 F.
App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s application of the First Jersey
Securities factors).
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a pecuniary award will not fully compensate a plaintiff unless it includes an
“interest component.”83 Therefore, when damages represent compensation
for lost wages, “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include prejudgment interest” in some manner.84 Practically, prejudgment interest
prevents employers from “enjoy[ing] an interest-free loan” at their
employees’ expense and promotes settlements by discouraging defendants
from delaying payments to injured plaintiffs.85 Despite these deterrent
effects, prejudgment interest is not considered to be a punitive award or an
additional penalty because the “essential rationale” for awarding
prejudgment interest is ensuring that a plaintiff is fully compensated.86
Finally, parties may stipulate to the recovery of “liquidated damages”—
predetermined or estimated amounts—in lieu of actual damages.87
Liquidated damages help aggrieved parties avoid the difficulty, expense,
and uncertainty of itemizing and proving damages in court.88
83. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2001); see also, e.g., City of Milwaukee v.
Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995); West Virginia, 479 U.S. at 310–
11; Devex, 461 U.S. at 655–56. But see Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352
(1939) (“[I]nterest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money
withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness. It is denied when its
exaction would be inequitable.”).
84. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873 (collecting cases and quoting Saulpaugh v. Monroe
Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993)); Donovan, 726 F.2d at 57–58 (“[I]t is
ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest in a back-pay award
under [§ 217 of] the FLSA.”); Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873–74), aff’d, 652 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.
2011).
85. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873–74 (quoting Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145); Donovan, 726
F.2d at 58 (“Failure to award interest would create an incentive to violate the FLSA, because
violators in effect would enjoy an interest-free loan for as long as they could delay paying
out back wages.”); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.6(1)–(2), at 333–34, 346.
86. See City of Milwaukee, 515 U.S. at 195 (“The essential rationale for awarding
prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss.”); see
also Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of a
prejudgment interest award . . . is to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of use of money.”
(quoting Chandler v. Bombardier Capital Inc., 44 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1994))); Donovan,
726 F.2d at 57–58 (describing prejudgment interest’s compensatory purpose and its
secondary deterrent effects); Lodges 743 & 1746, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. United
Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 447 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[A]wards of prejudgment interest are
essentially compensatory, and wrongdoing by a defendant is not a prerequisite to an award.”
(citation omitted)).
87. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (“[Liquidated damages are a]n
amount . . . stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered . . . .
[T]he sum fixed is the measure of damages . . . , whether it exceeds or falls short of the
actual damages.”). Of course, statutory multiple damages differ from traditional liquidated
damages, because the parties do not specify them—the legislature sets them instead. As the
Second Circuit observed, the FLSA’s use of the phrase is “something of a misnomer.” Brock
v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1063 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988).
88. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-718 (McKinney 2002) (allowing certain contracting
parties to set liquidated damages “at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.”); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 446, 448 (distinguishing “general damages,” which
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3. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages have a long history in Anglo-American
jurisprudence.89 Today, American courts consider punitive damages to be a
category of damages distinct from compensatory damages.90 Courts
regularly instruct juries on the twin goals of modern punitive awards:
deterrence and retribution.91 Thus, a defendant’s culpability is an important
factor, and courts typically limit punitive damages to cases of “enormity,
where a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence,
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others, or
behavior even more deplorable.”92 Large punitive awards might be
justified when wrongdoing is hard to detect or when an injury and its
corresponding compensatory award are small.93 Thus, punitive damages

frequently result from torts and “do not need to be specifically claimed,” from “special
damages,” which must be “specifically claimed or proved”).
89. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490–92 (2008) (surveying the
evolution of punitive damages in the Anglo-American tradition).
90. See id. at 492 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851)). See
generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 455 (“Punitive damages are sums awarded in
addition to any compensatory or nominal damages.”); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES § 1.4(B), at 17 (6th ed. 2010) (“[I]t has been a well settled doctrine in [the United
States] for over a century that punitive damages are non-compensatory in character.”).
91. For example, New York instructs juries: “The purpose of punitive damages is not to
compensate the plaintiff but to punish the defendant for [wanton, reckless, or malicious] acts
and thereby to discourage the defendant and other[s] from acting in a similar way in the
future.” 1B COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 2:278, at 830
(3d ed. 2012); see also Baker, 554 U.S. at 492–93, 513; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346, 352 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)
(“[P]unitive damages . . . are aimed at deterrence and retribution.”); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (stating that punitive damages are
“intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991);
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989); City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 455 (“Punitive damages
are sums awarded . . . , usually as punishment or deterrent.”); Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J.
2071, 2081–82 (1998).
92. Baker, 554 U.S. at 493 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Day, 54 U.S. at 371; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 448 (defining “punitive damages” as “[d]amages awarded in
addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit;
specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to
others” and explaining that punitive damages are intended to punish and deter
“blameworthy” conduct); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 9.3(A), at 634–39.
93. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 494 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 and RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576
(1982) (“It is in the nature of punitive remedies to authorize awards that may be out of
proportion to actual injury; such remedies typically are established to deter particular
conduct, and the legislature not infrequently finds that harsh consequences must be visited
upon those whose conduct it would deter.”).
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serve broad societal purposes94 and may even function like criminal
penalties.95
4. Statutory Multiple Damages
Many statutes specify awards that double, triple, or multiply damages by
some other factor.96 Such multiple damages can be compensatory or
punitive in nature.97 The distinction between compensatory and punitive
statutory damages is especially significant in New York, because a state
procedural rule bars recovery of statutory penalties in class actions unless
the statute imposing the penalty specifically authorizes class recovery.98
Punitive statutory multiple damages differ from the common law punitive
damages because statutes cap the maximum punitive award.99 The fixed
limit may reduce the potential threat to a defendant and “the possibility of a
measured deterrence.”100

94. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 491–92; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper Indus., 532 U.S.
at 432; Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (“[P]unitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and
deterrence.”); 1B NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2:278, at 838 (“Punitive
damages claims are quintessentially and exclusively public in their ultimate orientation and
purpose, even when prosecuted in the context of personal injury actions . . . . [P]unitive
damages have been held inapplicable to certain types of claims, . . . [absent] conduct aimed
at the public.”).
95. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417; see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 457
(explaining that punitive damages serve “as a means of securing public good through a kind
of quasi-criminal punishment in the civil suit”). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, the Court observed, “[a]lthough these awards serve the same purposes as
criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.” 538 U.S. at 417. The Court
used “three guideposts” to analyze the reasonableness of a $145 million punitive award
accompanying only $1 million in compensatory damages, including: “(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id.; see also Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 424;
Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. The most important guidepost is “the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
96. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 511–12 (collecting various statutes exemplifying multiple
damages provisions); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 541–42 (same); see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 447 (defining “multiple damages” as “[s]tatutory
damages (such as double or treble damages) that are a multiple of the amount that the factfinder determines to be owed”).
97. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543.
98. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (determining that N.Y. C.P.L.R.
901(b) does not preclude federal courts sitting in diversity from hearing class actions seeking
state statutory penalties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).
99. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 491 (distinguishing common law punitive damages as
“untethered to strict numerical multipliers” of statutes); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at
543 n.17 (explaining that extrastatutory punitive awards are “largely discretionary”).
100. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543.
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Statutory multiple damages can also serve “entirely non-punitive
purposes.”101 Some provide liquidated damages for actual losses that are
difficult to prove or otherwise unrecognized by the law.102 Others may
induce private enforcement of matters of public importance, which might
otherwise remain financially unattractive causes of action.103
When it comes to characterizing the nature of statutory multiple
damages, the presence of a “willfulness” or a similar scienter requirement is
often a key distinction between punitive and compensatory provisions.104
The word “willful,” although “widely used in the law,” lacks a clear
definition and is “generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely
negligent.”105 As the U.S. Supreme Court recently observed, “scienter
requirements are typical of punitive statutes, because [legislatures] often
wish[] to punish only those who intentionally break the law.”106 Generally,
multiple damages conditioned upon “serious wrongdoing” will appear
punitive, and those providing a ‘liquidated’ award compensatory.107 The

101. Id.
102. See id. (citing United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) and Overnight Motor
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942)); see also supra Part I.B.2 (describing
“liquidated damages”).
103. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 494–95, 511 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
344 (1979), which observes, “Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 [of the
Clayton Act] precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust
violations” to “provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available” for
official enforcement); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543–44 (citing Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S. 143 (1987)).
104. See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(2), at 468–75 (discussing the role a
defendant’s culpable state of mind often plays in punitive statutes).
105. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 135 (1988) (interpreting
“willful” as used in the FLSA’s statute of limitations as knowledge or reckless disregard);
see also Walton v. United Consumers Club, 786 F.2d 303, 308–09 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“Wilfulness is a weasel word denoting a range of culpability from gross negligence to actual
knowledge plus malice, depending on the context. Usually it denotes some highly culpable
mental state either actual knowledge that one’s acts violate the law or reckless indifference
to the law.” (citation omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 1737 (“[Willful
means v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”); id. (“[Willfulness is] 1.
The fact or quality of acting purposely or by design; deliberateness; intention. Willfulness
does not necessarily imply malice, but it involves more than just knowledge. 2. The
voluntary, intentional violation or disregard of a known legal duty.”).
106. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595 (2012). In
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court differentiated between
taxes and penalties, following the “functional approach” of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922). See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. “[T]hree practical
characteristics” convinced the Bailey Court that a purported tax on child labor was actually a
penalty: (1) the burden imposed was “exceedingly heavy”; (2) only those who “knowingly”
violated the law had to pay; and (3) enforcement was by the Department of Labor, “an
agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue.” Id.
107. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 544 (citing 15. U.S.C.A. § 117 and 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 216(a)); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 2.1(B), at 25–28 (describing the important role
culpability requirements play when identifying statutory multiple damages provisions as
punitive or nonpunitive).
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absence of a willfulness or scienter requirement, however, will not
necessarily disqualify a punitive characterization.108
C. Statutory Construction
Issues of statutory construction lie at the heart of this Note. After
introducing relevant principles of New York statutory construction, this
section examines leading decisions coloring the “purpose” or “nature” of
the FLSA and of the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages provisions.
1. Principles of New York Statutory Construction
In New York, legislative intent is the “great and controlling principle” in
statutory construction,109 and statutory text is the primary source of
legislative intent.110 The text of a multiple damages provision, however,
might not unambiguously suggest either a compensatory or a punitive
purpose. When statutory text is unclear, courts may attempt to divine
legislative intent from extrinsic sources, such as legislative history.111 Such
sources can help courts determine how the legislature intended to “suppress
the evil and advance the remedy” of a particular “mischief,”112 or further
the general underlying “object, spirit and purpose of the statute.”113

108. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (finding that a
multiple damages provision lacking a culpability requirement in the Jones Act was not
“merely” or “exclusively” compensatory, since the legislature had also designed it “to
prevent, by its coercive effect” delayed payments to seamen).
109. N.Y. Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 143 N.E.2d 256, 260 (N.Y. 1957) (quoting People v.
Ryan, 8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (N.Y. 1937)); see also N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 92, 191 (McKinney
1971); Albany Law Sch. v. Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 968 N.E.2d
967, 974 (N.Y. 2012) (“In matters of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to
discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intention.”).
110. See N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 94 (“The legislative intent is to be ascertained from the
words and language used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its
natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.”);
Albany Law Sch., 968 N.E.2d at 974 (“As we have repeatedly stated, the text of a provision
‘is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous
language to give effect to its plain meaning.’” (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer,
860 N.E.2d 705, 708 (N.Y. 2006)); Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 883 N.E.2d 990, 993–94
(N.Y. 2008); Dep’t of Welfare v. Siebel, 161 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 1959) (“Legislative intent is
to be determined primarily from the language used in the act under consideration.”).
111. See N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 120–25, 191; Albany Law Sch., 968 N.E.2d at 974
(“[W]e should inquire into the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires
examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Young v. Town of Huntington, 388 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981–
82 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976) (observing that courts may look to “legislative history,
the circumstances surrounding the statute’s passage, the general spirit and purpose
underlying the enactment, the recitals in the statute’s preamble, and the statements of the
statute’s draftsmen” (citations omitted)); STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
LEGAL RESEARCH 8 (9th ed. 2009).
112. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95.
113. Id. § 96.
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Generally, legislative history is comprised of documents reflecting the
information that lawmakers considered before enacting the legislation.114
Although Congress generates vast amounts of legislative history, state
legislative history is typically sparse.115 In New York, committee reports
and debate records are rare; all the courts typically have to rely upon are
governor’s bill jackets.116 Bill jackets cobble together assorted materials,
which may include a sponsor’s memorandum, constituents’ letters
concerning legislation awaiting the governor’s signature, or a governor’s
statement approving or vetoing a bill—in other words, “[n]ot much of a
window on legislative intent.”117
Even when relevant materials are available, they deserve only “some
weight in the absence of more definitive manifestations of legislative
purpose” and “must be cautiously used.”118 A governor’s statements may
be examined in an analysis of legislative intent, but such statements “suffer
from the same infirmities” as those that legislators make during floor
debates—namely that “it is impossible to determine with certainty” whether
an individual’s views are attributable to an entire legislative body.119
In many instances, extrinsic aids for determining state legislative intent
do not exist at all.120 When federal laws are models for state laws,
however, Congress’s intent and the history of the federal laws may inform
interpretations of the state laws, since the state legislature presumably had
the same objectives where it employed similar terminology.121 Uniform
114. See BARKAN, supra note 111, at xxxii–iii, 157 (defining “legislative history” as
documents and other materials providing “background information and insight into the
purpose and intent of statutes”); Legislative Intent, N.Y. ST. LIBR., http://www.nysl
.nysed.gov/legint.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2013).
115. See BARKAN, supra note 111, at 207; Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State
Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. REV. 595, 600 (1997); Legislative Intent, supra note
114.
116. See Kaye, supra note 115, at 600.
117. See id.; Legislative Intent, supra note 114. See generally ROBERT ALLAN CARTER,
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEW YORK STATE: MATERIALS, CASES AND ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001) (surveying the research process for legislative intent in New
York); William H. Manz, If It’s Out There: Researching Legislative Intent in New York, 77
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 43 (2005) (same).
118. Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 981–82 (N.Y.
1998).
119. Id. at 982; see United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897)
(“[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the
members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual
members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and
those who spoke might differ from each other.”); see also N.Y. STAT. LAW § 14 (McKinney
1971) (“The Governor’s function in approving and disapproving bills submitted by the
Legislature, as required by the [state’s] Constitution, is legislative in nature.”). In Majewski
v. Broadalbin-Perth Central School District, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a
governor’s explicit statements that a statute should apply retroactively. See 696 N.E.2d at
984.
120. See Legislative Intent, supra note 114.
121. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 262 (“In interpreting an ambiguous statute of New York, the
court may consider the construction placed on a similar statute of another state or country by
its courts.”); H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (App. Div.
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construction is desirable, and federal constructions of federal laws are
highly persuasive, yet they are not binding on state courts interpreting state
laws.122
2. Construing FLSA Liquidated Damages As Compensatory and the
Unavailability of Prejudgment Interest
Although 29 U.S.C. § 216 is entitled “Penalties,” within five years of the
FLSA’s enactment, the Supreme Court ruled that the liquidated damages
provision is compensatory in nature.123 In Overnight Motor Transportation
Co. v. Missel,124 the Court rejected a due process challenge to § 216’s
mandatory liquidated damages provision.125 The Court explained that
regardless of an employer’s good faith or reasonableness, the liquidated
damages provision neither violates due process nor warrants shifting the
burden of proof to employees who are “no more at fault than the
employer.”126 The Court distinguished § 216’s liquidated damages from
the “threat of criminal proceedings,” “prohibitive fines,” and “double
damages treated as penalties.”127 The Court also emphasized that § 216
provides “compensation, not a penalty or punishment,” because wage
underpayments “may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of
proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages.”128
A few years later, the Court reinforced Missel’s characterization of
§ 216’s liquidated damages as compensatory.129 In Brooklyn Savings Bank
v. O’Neil,130 the Court held that a plaintiff may not recover prejudgment
4th Dep’t 1979) (“Since the State law was modeled after the Federal law in this respect, for
construction of the State law we look to the cases which have construed the [federal law].”)
(citations omitted); Young v. Town of Huntington, 388 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1976); Sterling Factors Corp. v. Sad Sam’s Furnitureland of Binghamton, Inc., 195
N.Y.S.2d 55, 58–59 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1960) (considering the legislative history of
other states’ statutes, upon which a contested statute was modeled).
122. See In re Lazarus, 52 N.Y.S.2d 682, 687 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1944) (“While Federal
statutes and decisions are not binding on us, they are highly persuasive and uniformity in
interpretation is desirable.”), aff’d, 64 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1945); Manhattan Storage &
Warehouse Co. v. Movers & Warehousemen’s Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 28 N.Y.S.2d 594
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1941), rev’d on other grounds, 43 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1942); People ex
rel. Mosbacher v. Graves, 5 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1938) (“It is apparent
that this state statute was copied verbatim from the federal, thus indicating a strong
legislative intent for uniformity in interpretation.”), aff’d, 19 N.E.2d 89 (N.Y. 1939); Young,
388 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006) (entitled “Penalties”); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v.
Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1942) (determining that the FLSA’s liquidated damages are
compensatory); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945); Herman
v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003).
124. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
125. See id. at 583.
126. Id. at 582–84.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also supra notes 87–88, 102, 107 and accompanying text.
129. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707–08, 715 (1945).
130. See id.
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interest in addition to § 216 liquidated damages.131 The Court reiterated
that an employee’s actual injuries may be “too obscure and difficult of
proof for estimate”132 and added that § 216’s liquidated damages
compensate employees “for delay in payment.”133 The Court emphasized
Congress’s concerns for low-wage employees, who, “receiving less than the
statutory minimum[,] are not likely to have sufficient resources to maintain
their well-being and efficiency until such sums are paid.”134 Consequently,
underpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation “may be so
detrimental” to these vulnerable workers “that double payment must be
made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to
that minimum standard of well-being.”135 The Court concluded that
layering prejudgment interest upon liquidated damages would be
“inconsistent with Congressional intent,” since Congress had already “seen
fit to fix the sums recoverable for delay.”136 In sum, combining
prejudgment interest with the FLSA’s liquidated damages would produce
an impermissible double recovery.137
In the wake of Brooklyn Savings Bank, Congress amended the FLSA,
granting district courts discretion to reduce or deny liquidated damages
where an employer demonstrates a reasonable, good-faith attempt to
comply with the FLSA.138 As a result, some workers might not receive any

131. Id. at 714–16; 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-164.
132. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707 (citing Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572 (1942)).
133. Id. at 715 (noting that § 216(b) “authorizes the recovery of liquidated damages as
compensation for delay in payment of sums due under the [FLSA]”); see also 2 KEARNS,
supra note 8, at 18-164 (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. 697); Carrasco v. W. Vill. Ritz
Corp., No. 11 Civ. 7843, 2012 WL 3822238, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (citing Reilly v.
NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999)).
134. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 708; see also Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726
F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The award of interest [in a § 217 case] is especially
appropriate for wage earners, who ordinarily do not have access to resources other than their
wages to meet the necessities of daily living.”).
135. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707–08 (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)
(1940)); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
136. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 715.
137. See id. at 715–16 (“To allow an employee to recover the basic statutory wage and
liquidated damages, with interest, would have the effect of giving an employee double
compensation for damages arising from delay in the payment of the basic minimum
wages.”); see also supra Part I.B.1. As a corollary, prejudgment interest is available in
§ 217 actions, where liquidated damages are not authorized. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216
(2006), with id. § 217. In Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., the Second Circuit upheld the
Secretary of Labor’s entitlement to collect unpaid overtime wages on behalf of employees,
but disallowed liquidated damages because § 217 does not authorize them. Brock v. Superior
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1064–65 (2d Cir. 1988). On motion for clarification, the court
permitted an award of prejudgment interest, because “[o]nce we have disallowed liquidated
damages [in a § 217 action], there is no reason to deny the Secretary the opportunity to
collect prejudgment interest, which is normally awarded in FLSA suits in the absence of
liquidated damages.” Id. at 1064; see also Donovan, 726 F.2d at 57–58 (awarding
prejudgment interest in a § 217 action).
138. See Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 251–262) (providing the good-faith defense codified at 29 U.S.C. § 260); Trans
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liquidated damages as compensation for delay. The availability of a goodfaith defense, however, has not deterred the Second Circuit from following
Brooklyn Savings Bank’s characterization of § 216’s liquidated damages as
compensatory, rather than punitive.139 As the court asserted, “[t]he
possibility that a judge may in narrow circumstances relieve an employer of
its obligation to pay alters neither Section 216’s general command that
liquidated damages be paid nor our repeated recognition that these
damages count as compensation.”140
3. Construing NYLL Liquidated Damages As Punitive and the Availability
of Prejudgment Interest
The punitive nature of NYLL liquidated damages derives from Carter v.
Frito-Lay, Inc.141 In a two-page opinion, the New York Appellate
Division, First Department, concluded that New York’s Civil Procedure
Law and Rule 901(b) prohibits class recovery of liquidated damages under
the 1967 Version, because such damages constitute a “penalty.”142 The
court provided two reasons for rejecting arguments that the 1967 Version’s
liquidated damages constituted purely additional compensation.143 First,
the court relied on the 1967 Version’s text, observing that recovery is
“expressly conditioned on a finding of willful conduct on the part of the
employer.”144 Second, the court cited the statute’s legislative history,
specifically characterizing a memorandum that Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller issued upon signing the 1967 Version into law as “pointedly
refer[ing]” to a deterrent and retributive scheme.145 The court quoted the
memorandum, stating that the provision is a “stronger sanction against an
employer for willful failure to pay wages . . . [and] should result in greater
compliance with the law.”146 The court concluded, “It is clear that
liquidated damages as provided in this statute, and especially as viewed in
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985); see also supra notes 39–46 and
accompanying text.
139. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As we have said
with regard to FLSA’s liquidated damages provision in the past, ‘[l]iquidated damages are
not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the
delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer’s violation of the FLSA.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999))),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1000 (2011); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58,
71 (2d Cir. 1997).
140. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added).
141. 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980), aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y.
1981).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id. Here, the court’s reasoning parallels the Supreme Court’s in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 411 U.S. 111 (1985), where the Court relied upon a willfulness
requirement to distinguish a “punitive” liquidated damages provision from the FLSA’s
compensatory provision. Id. at 125–28. For a discussion of Thurston, see infra Part II.B.
145. Carter, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
146. See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Administration Memorandum, reprinted in
1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184).
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this context, constitute a penalty.”147 In a two-sentence opinion, the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision “for reasons stated in the
memorandum at the Appellate Division.”148
The New York Court of Appeals separately discussed the legislative
history of the 1967 Version in Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub & Co.,149 where
the court held that section 198(1-a) does not apply to a common law breach
of contract claim.150 Based on materials in the bill jacket, Gottlieb
concluded that supporters of the 1967 Version treated all of the remedies in
section 198 as “addressing the same problem (i.e., employers’ violation of
the wage laws), having the same objective (enhancing enforcement of the
Labor Law’s substantive wage enforcement provisions), and providing
cumulative remedies for wage claims brought thereunder.”151 The court
cited NYDOL’s supporting memorandum, which, according to the court,
frames the bill’s “sole” purpose as “[t]o assist the enforcement of the wage
payment and minimum wage payment laws by imposing greater sanctions
on employers for violation of those laws.”152 The court also cited a
memorandum from the state AFL-CIO, which characterizes section
198(1-a)’s provisions for attorney’s fees and liquidated damages
collectively as “one more safeguard to assure employees of proper payment
of wages under the law and would thus be a deterrent against abuses and
violations.”153
Carter laid the foundation for the Second Circuit’s decision in Reilly v.
NatWest Markets Group Inc.,154 which held that an employee may recover
state prejudgment interest in addition to the 1967 Version’s liquidated
damages for the same underlying wage.155 NatWest had argued that
Reilly’s state liquidated damages award should obviate additional state
prejudgment interest.156 NatWest’s position relied upon In re CIS Corp.,157
in which a bankruptcy court declined to award prejudgment interest because
NYLL liquidated damages “are in the nature of compensation for the lost
use of wages . . . [and] are the functional equivalent of pre-judgment
interest. [Awarding both] would provide [the plaintiff] redress twice for the
147. Id.
148. Carter v. Frito-Lay Inc., 419 N.E.2d 1079, 1079 (N.Y. 1981).
149. 626 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1993).
150. See id.
151. Id. at 33.
152. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (Apr. 5 1967),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 4).
153. Id. (second emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from N.Y. State AFL-CIO,
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 11).
154. 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999).
155. See id. at 265; see also, e.g., Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012
WL 3878113, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012) (following Reilly’s approach to prejudgment
interest), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012).
Reilly does not mention Gottlieb at all. See Mark Walfish & Adrienne B. Koch, Awarding
Attorneys’ Fees and Liquidated Damages, 223 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2000) (“No reference to Gottlieb
is contained in the [Reilly] court’s opinion.”).
156. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 265.
157. 206 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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same loss.”158 However, the Reilly court found the bankruptcy court’s
reasoning “unpersuasive.”159 Because of Carter’s determination that
“liquidated damages under [section 198(1-a)] ‘constitute a penalty’ to deter
an employer’s willful withholding of wages,” the Second Circuit concluded
that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages were exclusively punitive in
nature.160 The court permitted Reilly to recover both state liquidated
damages and state prejudgment interest, because the awards “serve
fundamentally different purposes” and are not “functional equivalents.”161
II. THE QUAGMIRE: THE UNDERLYING INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE
CONFLICTING SIGNALS THE 2009 AND 2010 AMENDMENTS SEND
Although Reilly addressed the intersection of state prejudgment interest
and state liquidated damages, that decision came to serve as the basis for an
intracircuit split over whether plaintiffs may, under the 1967 Version,
recover both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages upon the same unpaid
wages (i.e., 125 percent liquidated damages). Courts awarding recovery
under both statutes reasoned that each liquidated damages provision served
a different purpose, so no double recovery occurred.162 Other courts
adopted the position that the FLSA and NYLL’s liquidated damages
provisions remedied the same harms or accomplished the same practical
purposes, so awarding both would offend double recovery.163
Before the Second Circuit addressed the split, the state legislature
amended section 198(1-a) twice.164 In light of these amendments, a new
analysis is necessary to guide courts facing demands for both state and
federal liquidated damages on the same underlying wage. Reilly was
decided a decade before these amendments drastically changed the statute’s
text. The Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals have

158. Id. at 690; Reilly, 181 F.3d at 265.
159. Reilly,181 F.3d at 265.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); Maldonado v. La Nueva Rampa, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8195, 2012 WL
1669341, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing prejudgment
interest’s compensatory nature).
162. See, e.g., Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., No. 09-CV-5018, 2012 WL 4369754, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (“[T]he two statutory provisions serve different purposes and are
therefore not mutually exclusive.”); Santillan v. Henao, 822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 297 (E.D.N.Y
2011) (“Because each award serves fundamentally different purposes, plaintiff may be
granted both awards.”); Wicaksono v. XYZ 48 Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3635, 2011 WL 2022644,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011); Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261–62
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
163. See, e.g., Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Janus, 2012 WL 3878113, at *8; Drozd v. Vlaval Constr., Inc.,
No. 09 CV 5122, 2011 WL 9192036, at *15 n.19 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4815639 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012).
164. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450–
51; Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086.
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acknowledged the amendments, but neither has interpreted them.165 Of
course, a judicial determination of legislative purpose is a prerequisite to
the “different purposes” analysis. As discussed in this part, only a handful
of district courts have recognized the need for fresh analysis. Others
continue to apply interpretations of the 1967 Version to the amended
text.166
This part begins by supplementing the discussions in Carter and Gottlieb
regarding the 1967 Version’s legislative history.167 Then, it presents the
changes that the 2009 and 2010 Amendments’ wrought upon section 198(1a) and provides evidence of the state legislature’s motivations for enacting
those amendments.
A. Revisiting the 1967 Version’s Legislative History
Nothing in Reilly suggests that the Second Circuit independently
examined the legislative history underlying Carter’s decision. In fact, the
very same governor’s memorandum upon which Carter relies explicitly
asserts that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages would “compensate the
employee for the loss of the use of the money to which he was entitled.”168
Carter omits this language from its quotation, although it is in the
memorandum’s next sentence.169
Governor Rockefeller’s memorandum echoed statements other interested
parties expressed before the 1967 Version became law—statements which
the Carter and Gottlieb analyses both omit.170 Such statements are
memorialized in the 1967 Version’s bill jacket, which contains not only the
governor’s memorandum but also numerous other submissions.171 For
example, the sponsor’s memorandum explains that liquidated damages

165. See Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 366 n.9 (2d Cir. 2011); Ryan v.
Kellogg Partners Institutional Servs., 968 N.E.2d 947, 952 n.8 (N.Y. 2012).
166. See, e.g., Garcia v. Giorgio’s Brick Oven & Wine Bar, No. 11 Civ. 4689, 2012 WL
3339220, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (relying on cases interpreting the 1967 Version
to support a “different purposes” analysis applied to the current statutory text), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3893537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Angamarca v. Pita
Grill 7 Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7777, 2012 WL 3578781, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (same).
167. For discussions of Carter and Gottlieb, see supra Part I.C.3.
168. Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in
N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14.
169. Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980) (quoting
Administration Memorandum, reprinted in 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184), aff’d, 419
N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981); see also Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
(Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14.
170. See N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310. For discussions of Carter and Gottlieb, see
supra Part I.C.3.
171. The relevant bill jacket contains a more comprehensive collection of materials than
the 1967 New York State Legislative Annual, which Carter cites. Compare N.Y. Bill Jacket
1967, ch. 310, with 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184; see also Carter, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 116
(citing 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184, but not the bill jacket).
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would serve both punitive and compensatory purposes.172 First, as
“stronger sanctions,” they would result in “greater compliance with the
law.”173 Second, they would “compensate the employee for the loss of the
use of the money to which he was entitled.”174 Similarly, the Division of
Budget observed that liquidated damages would both “improve
compliance” and “repay workers for a good deal of anguish, time and
money.”175 Furthermore, NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcing
the NYLL, also commented on the provision’s dual purposes.176 NYDOL’s
memorandum justified liquidated damages as both a way to “impos[e]
greater sanctions” against violators and a way to compensate underpaid
workers while avoiding complicated back pay calculations.177
B. The Importance of “Willfulness” or Similar Scienter Requirements
In addition to legislative history, Carter rests upon the 1967 Version’s
text—namely its explicit inclusion of a “willfulness” requirement.178 The
2009 Amendment eliminated that requirement.179 Now, the NYLL, like the
FLSA, presumes liquidated damages are available unless an employer can
establish a good-faith defense.180 The following discussion explores the
roles scienter requirements played in three U.S. Supreme Court opinions
interpreting analogous statutory multiple damages provisions.
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,181 the Supreme Court
addressed whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s182
172. See Letter from Assemblyman Frank A. Carroll to Robert R. Douglass, Counsel to
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Mar. 31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch.
310, at 2–3.
173. Id. at 3; Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14.
174. Letter from Assemblyman Frank A. Carroll to Robert R. Douglass, Counsel to
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Mar. 31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch.
310, at 3; Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in
N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14.
175. Budget Report on Bills (Apr. 6, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at
6.
176. See Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (Apr. 5, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket
1967, ch. 310, at 4–5.
177. See id. (observing that the “bill follows the example of the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act in providing an easily-calculable formula for liquidated damages” and that
liquidated damages will “also compensate the employee for the loss of the use of the
money”). Gottlieb’s discussion of NYDOL’s memorandum omits this language. See
Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub & Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1993); see also supra note 152
and accompanying text.
178. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980),
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981).
179. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086.
180. The FLSA’s defense provision also explicitly requires reasonableness, while the
NYLL’s does not. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a)
(McKinney Supp. 2013). As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook quipped, “[a] good heart but an
empty head does not produce a defense” under § 260. Walton v. United Consumers Club,
786 F.2d 303, 312 (7th Cir. 1986).
181. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
182. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
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(ADEA) inclusion of a willfulness requirement distinguished its liquidated
damages provision from the FLSA’s.183 Congress passed the ADEA in
1967 as an amendment to the FLSA.184 Section 7(b) of the ADEA was
modeled on and explicitly incorporates the FLSA’s liquidated damages
provision, but limits such awards to “cases of willful violations.”185 The
Court, recognizing Congress’s familiarity with the FLSA’s provisions and
with judicial interpretations of them, held that Congress intended the
ADEA’s liquidated damages to be punitive in nature, because the
willfulness proviso “significantly” distinguished the ADEA’s provision
from the FLSA’s.186 Consequently, the ADEA’s liquidated damages are
only available for violations when an employee demonstrates an employer’s
knowledge of or reckless disregard for the law.187
After Thurston, an intercircuit split arose over whether ADEA liquidated
damages displaced prejudgment interest, or whether they were “strictly
punitive” and prejudgment interest could supplement them.188 The Second
Circuit, following Thurston’s characterization of the ADEA’s liquidated
damages as punitive, reasoned that prejudgment interest and ADEA
liquidated damages serve different purposes, so both can be recovered on
the same wage claim.189
Subsequently, in Commissioner v. Schleier,190 the Supreme Court
reiterated the importance of the “willfulness” distinction between FLSA and

183. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 111.
184. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 614 (1993); Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125–26; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-26.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Section 7(b) provides that the ADEA “shall be enforced in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in . . . § 216 (except for
subsection (a) thereof)” and that “[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of
this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall
be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.” Id.; see also Biggins, 507 U.S.
at 606; Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978));
Walton, 786 F.2d at 308.
186. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (“Moreover, § [2]16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the
award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a
proviso that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to double damages ‘only in cases of willful
violations.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b))).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126. The Court reaffirmed Thurston’s
“willfulness” standard in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), which
interpreted “willful” in the FLSA’s statute of limitations as consistent with the Thurston
standard of knowledge or reckless disregard. Id. at 133; see also Biggins, 507 U.S. at 614–15
(observing McLaughlin’s reaffirmation of Thurston).
188. See, e.g., Downey v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 836, 839–40 (7th Cir. 1994) (surveying the
split).
189. See Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir.
1987) (“[P]rejudgment interest does not provide a double recovery to victims of age
discrimination who have proven their entitlement to liquidated damages as well as back
pay.”); see also Chandler v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 44 F.3d 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1994)
(following Reichman).
190. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).

1908

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

ADEA liquidated damages.191 In Schleier, the Court rejected Schleier’s
argument that Congress intended “liquidated damages under the ADEA
serve, at least in part, to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries that are
difficult to quantify” by incorporating the FLSA’s liquidated damages
provision.192 The Court acknowledged that portions of the ADEA’s
legislative history supported Schleier’s position.193 Nonetheless, the Court
invoked precedent: “We have already concluded that the liquidated
damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those
in the FLSA, and we explicitly held in Thurston: ‘Congress intended for
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.’”194 The Court stressed the
importance of the willfulness requirement, explaining that, “[i]f liquidated
damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no reason
why the employer’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should
be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages.”195
On the other hand, the Court does not always condition a punitive
characterization upon the inclusion of a willfulness or scienter requirement.
In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,196 a seaman sued his former
employer for unpaid wages and penalties under the Jones Act, which the
Court explained had authorized seamen who were not paid promptly upon
discharge to recover “two days’ pay for each and every day” of delay in
which a shipmaster or owner “refuses or neglects to make payment . . .
without sufficient cause.”197 The district court, in its discretion, had
reduced the time period in which Griffin’s overdue wages remained
outstanding, ultimately calculating a penalty of $6,881.60.198 Griffin
appealed, arguing that a literal application of the statute precluded such
discretion and that he should have received over $300,000 because of the
$412.50 in wages Oceanic had withheld.199 Oceanic responded that the
statute served remedial and compensatory purposes, so the award Griffin
sought was “so far in excess of any equitable remedy as to be punitive.”200
Agreeing with Oceanic, the Court observed that it was “highly probable”
that the damages Griffin sought would “greatly exceed[] any actual injury”
191. See id. at 326 (“[U]nlike the FLSA, the ADEA specifically provides that ‘liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.’” (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) and Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125)).
192. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 331.
193. See id. at 331–32.
194. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court observed that Thurston already
had considered the legislative history pertaining to the liquidated damages’ compensatory
effects but had not found it persuasive. See id. at 332 n.5.
195. Id. at 332 n.5. The Court did not address the effect that the availability of a goodfaith defense has upon this logic. Cf. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir.
2010) (explaining that the availability to employers of a good-faith defense which could
deprive employees of liquidated damages does not affect the compensatory nature of FLSA
liquidated damages); see also supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
196. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
197. Id. at 570.
198. See id. at 568.
199. See id. at 568, 574–75.
200. Id. at 571.
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the delayed payment had caused.201 Still, the Court ruled for Griffin,
because the statutory awards were not “merely” or “exclusively”
compensatory, but also punitive since Congress had designed the statute “to
prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce
prompt payment when payment is possible.”202
Aside from eliminating the willfulness requirement, nothing in the text or
legislative history of the 2009 or the 2010 Amendments suggests that the
New York legislature intended to change the punitive gloss that courts, like
Reilly, had assigned to section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages provision.
Then again, nothing acknowledges that gloss in the first place.203 Rather,
the 2009 Amendment was introduced at the request of NYDOL to “expand
worker protections and remedies against employers who violate Labor Law
requirements related to wage payment.”204 The bill raised section 215’s
penalties, untouched since the 1960s, but the amount of liquidated damages
available to employees under section 198(1-a) remained at 25 percent.205
Instead, as the bill’s sponsor and NYDOL both explained, the bill shifted
section 198(1-a)’s burden of proof to eliminate the “inherent unfairness” of
requiring an employee to shoulder the “onerous burden” of demonstrating
that an employer’s violation was willful to obtain liquidated damages.206
The bill’s sponsor expected primarily low-wage workers “struggling to
support their families on the minimum wage” to benefit from this
change.207

201. Id. at 575.
202. Id. (quoting Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1930)).
203. Nonetheless, legislators are presumably aware of existing judicial interpretations.
See Schmidt v. Falls Dodge, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 399, 403 (N.Y. 2012) (Ciparick, J., dissenting)
(observing that “the legislative history of a particular enactment must be reviewed in light of
the existing decisional law which the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with” and that
settled interpretations become “as much a part of the enactment as if incorporated into the
language of the act itself” (quoting Matter of Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. Greenberg, 511
N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
204. See Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor
David A. Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10.
205. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, §§ 1–2, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086–87; Letter
from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A. Paterson
(Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11. Floor debates in the
state Assembly and Senate focused on the increased penalty provisions and availability of a
good-faith defense for employers but reveal little about the issues this Note addresses. See
N.Y. State Senate, Record of Proceedings 6547–51 (July 16, 2009) (Bill No. 6963) (remarks
of Sen. Stephen M. Saland) (opposing the bill because statutory “penalties get increased
rather dramatically without the benefit of the good-faith exception that’s recognized for
purposes of the liquidated damages”); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 268–71
(June 22, 2009) (Bill No. 6963) (remarks of Assemb. Kenneth P. Zebrowski) (responding to
Assemblyman James D. Conte’s questions about increased penalties and the good-faith
defense).
206. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372,
at 6; Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A.
Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11.
207. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372,
at 6.
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C. The NYLL’s Newfound Conformity with the FLSA
In effect, the 2009 and 2010 Amendments conform the NYLL’s
liquidated damages provision to the FLSA’s. Together, the amendments
eliminated section 198(1-a)’s willfulness requirement, provided employers
with a good-faith defense, and increased liquidated damages from 25
percent to 100 percent.208
Since the amendments’ enactment, however, no court interpreting section
198(1-a) has acknowledged a legislative intent to attain any degree of
conformity with federal law. Still, some courts have commented on the
laws’ effective convergence as impacting the analysis underlying the
intracircuit split.209 As Magistrate Judge James Orenstein remarked in
dicta, “To the extent the federal and state statutes now provide for
essentially identical remedies with respect to liquidated damages, it is
harder to argue that they are designed to compensate a plaintiff for disparate
harms.”210 Similarly, Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein has also
observed that the federal and state provisions now address the same
harms.211 Finally, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck found the arguments
favoring a single set of liquidated damages “even more compelling” now
that the NYLL’s liquidated damages “mirror” the FLSA’s.212
Although courts have not mentioned it, the legislative history does
address the NYLL’s conformity with the FLSA. In support of the 2009
Amendment, the sponsor’s memorandum stated that the bill would
208. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney
Supp. 2013).
209. For a brief discussion of the split, see supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
210. Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., No. 09-CV-5018, 2012 WL 4369754, at *9 n.11
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012); Siemieniewicz v. CAZ Contracting Corp., No. 11-CV-0704,
2012 WL 5183375, at *12 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted as modified, 2012 WL 5183000 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2012).
211. See Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 2012) (awarding liquidated damages under only one statute because the federal and
state awards address the same harms); Paz v. Piedra, No. 09 Civ. 03977, 2012 WL 121103,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (same). In both Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc. and Paz v.
Piedra, Magistrate Judge Gorenstein cited Chun Jie Yin v. Kim, No. 07 CV 1236, 2008 WL
906736 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008), as supporting the proposition that the federal and state
statutes both address the same harms. See Greathouse, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7; Paz, 2012
WL 121103 at *12. In Kim, however, Magistrate Judge Orenstein had applied the 1967
Version, under which New York still required willfulness. See Kim, 2008 WL 906736, at *4.
Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Orenstein subsequently found error in his conclusion in Kim.
See Siemieniewicz, 2012 WL 5183375, at *12 n.10. In any event, both the NYLL and the
FLSA now award liquidated damages unless an employer establishes the good-faith defense.
Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a).
212. See Li Ping Fu v. Pop Art Int’l Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8562, 2011 WL 4552436, at *5 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011). Judge Denise L. Cote adopted Magistrate Judge Peck’s Report
and Recommendation, as modified, on clear error review, because “courts in [the Second]
Circuit are split as to whether a plaintiff may recover both federal and state liquidated
damages for the same overtime violation.” Li Ping Fu v. Pop Art Int’l, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
8562, 2011 WL 6092309, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). As discussed in Part II.D, infra,
Judge Cote’s own analysis of the 2010 Amendment’s legislative history in McLean v.
Garage Management Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3950, 2012 WL 1358739, *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2012), suggests that she might reach a contrary conclusion.
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“conform New York law to the Fair Labor Standards Act.”213 Similarly,
NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcement, submitted a
memorandum reiterating the sponsor’s observation.214 The Legal Aid
Society215 and NELP216 also submitted memoranda noting the state’s step
toward conformity with the FLSA.
In 2009, the state avoided full conformity with the FLSA.217 Whatever
reservations may have existed in 2009, however, were overcome by 2010,
when the WTPA increased liquidated damages from 25 percent to 100
percent.218 This time, however, neither the bill’s sponsor, NYDOL, nor the
governor mentioned conformity with the FLSA.219 Nevertheless, interested
third parties noted the effect. For example, the Legal Aid Society observed,
“Damages owed, on top of wages, will be increased from 25% to 100%—
matching the damage level in twenty-four other States and under federal
law.”220 Other parties making similar observations include Coalition for
the Homeless,221 Jobs with Justice,222 and Make the Road.223
D. The Twin Goals of Deterrence and Retribution
Before Governor Rockefeller signed the 1967 Version into law,
constituents were already criticizing its weak enforcement scheme. For
213. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372,
at 6.
214. See Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor
David A. Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11.
215. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A.
Paterson (Aug. 20, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 22 (“[The bill]
brings State law into conformance with existing federal protections which allow recovery of
liquidated damages in all cases of wage underpayment unless the employer can demonstrate
a good-faith belief that his or her underpayment was legal.”).
216. Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David
A. Paterson (Aug. 17, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 20 (“This
proposal would take a first step toward making New York state law more consistent with
federal law in awarding damages for minimum wage and overtime violations.”).
217. See Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch.
372, at 6 (“The bill would not impact the 25 percent cap on liquidated damages allowed to
New York employers, unlike many other jurisdictions that allow recovery of 100 percent
liquidated damages.”).
218. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450.
219. See Introducer’s Memorandum in Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill
Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 5–8; Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan,
Counsel to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 10, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010,
ch. 564, at 9–10; Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS.
ANN. 428–31.
220. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 18 (emphasis added).
221. See Letter from Coal. for the Homeless to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 9,
2011), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 75. The letter appears misdated as
2011 because it advocates legislation enacted in 2010.
222. See Letter from Jobs with Justice to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 7, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 19.
223. See Letter from Make the Road to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 3, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 34.
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example, although ultimately supporting enactment, the New York County
Lawyers’ Association complained that the bill’s protections did not go far
enough.224 As the association explained, “The category of workers to
whom these remedies are directed are notoriously low paid, and, the
remedies, even as improved by the proposal, do not approach the potential
of the remedies of the [FLSA] which allows up to 100% of liquidated
damages.”225 Likewise, the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Labor characterized the 25 percent liquidated damages as “minimal,” since
similar violations of federal law would lead to recovery of “an amount
equal to the unpaid wages as liquidated damages.”226
These concerns remained germane for decades. In 1997, New York
passed the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act,227 which, inter alia, increased
criminal penalties under section 198-a.228 For repeat offenders, the act also
authorized officials to collect a “sum as a civil penalty in an amount equal
to double the total [wages] found to be due,” while liquidated damages
remained at 25 percent.229 In a statement of purpose, the legislature
lamented the continued “[e]xploitation of these most vulnerable workers,”
especially those in the garment and service industries.230 It asserted, “The
purpose of this legislation, therefore, is to provide [NYDOL] and working
people with stronger and more varied tools with which to collect unpaid
wages.”231 As the governor’s memorandum explained, “Increasing the
monetary penalties against dishonest employers will help deter wage law
violations.”232 In 2009, the legislature once again increased penalties but
not liquidated damages.233
The 2010 Amendment, however, increased section 198(1-a)’s liquidated
damages for the first time in nearly forty-five years.234 The WTPA’s bill
jacket brims with statements about the need to deter and punish wage and

224. See Letter from N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n to Governor Nelson A Rockefeller (Mar.
31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 7–9. The association’s comments
specifically address section 2 of the bill regarding section 663 of the NYLL, but do not take
a position on the identical provisions in section 1 of the bill regarding section 198(1-a) of the
NYLL. See id.; see also supra note 9 (relating N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) to § 663).
225. Letter from N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n to Governor Nelson A Rockefeller (Mar. 31,
1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 9.
226. Memorandum from N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Labor, reprinted in N.Y. Bill
Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 10.
227. ch. 605, § 5, 1997 N.Y. Laws 3392.
228. See id. It also amended Section 198(3) but left Section 198(1-a) unaffected. See id.
§ 4, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3393.
229. See id. § 7, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3393–94.
230. See id. § 1, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3392–93.
231. Id.; see also Letter from Senator Carl L. Marcellino to Michael C. Finnegan,
Counsel to Governor George E. Pataki (July 8, 1997), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1997, ch.
605, at 7–8.
232. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1997, ch. 605,
at 6.
233. Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, §§ 1–2, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086–87; see also
supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text (discussing the changes of 2009).
234. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450.
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hour violations.235 The bill’s sponsor criticized existing penalties as
“minimal and offer[ing] little deterrent,” but observed that this systemic
shortcoming would “change dramatically,” since “[p]enalties for violating
employee rights would be increased in order to far better protect workers’
rights and interests.”236
Similarly, NYDOL noted that the WTPA contains “numerous provisions
intended to deter and punish the nonpayment or underpayment of wages to
employees . . . . [including] increases [in] penalties . . . ; [and] liquidated
damages that will be payable to employees under certain circumstances
from 25 to 100 percent of amounts owed.”237 NYDOL observed that the
WTPA would benefit underpaid low-wage workers who are deprived of
income for rent, groceries, heating, and their families’ other basic needs,
and who must rely on public assistance.238 NYDOL believed the WTPA
would both “create new deterrents” and help these aggrieved workers “seek
redress.”239
NYDOL urged the WTPA’s enactment because the “[c]urrent penalties
for wage theft are so low that there is a financial incentive to underpay
workers.”240 As NELP explained, employers had little to lose, because the
savings realized through underpayments “often outweigh the costs, even for
those few who are apprehended.”241 NELP called upon the legislature to
“up[] the ante”242 for wage and hour violations “to better ensure compliance
and deterrence.”243
Other interested parties, such as the New York City Council,244 Jobs with
Justice,245 the Legal Aid Society,246 and Make the Road247 also supported
enactment, bemoaning the inadequacy of the existing enforcement scheme.
As the Legal Aid Society stated, “noncompliance with the basic protections
of New York Labor Law is often the norm, not the exception . . . . The
235. See generally N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564.
236. Introducer’s Memorandum in Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket
2010, ch. 564, at 8.
237. Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David
A. Paterson (Dec. 10, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 9.
238. See id. at 10.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 9.
241. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 52. As NELP explained, “When we talked to
employers in low-wage industries, we heard over and over the calculus that results in wage
theft: If you get caught, you basically just end up paying the wages you would have paid in
the first place, so what’s to lose?” Bernhardt, supra note 21.
242. Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 56–57.
243. Bernhardt, supra note 21; see also BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 52.
244. Res. 0245-2010, N.Y.C. Council (2010); Proposed Res. 245-A, N.Y.C. Council
(2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 42–43.
245. See Letter from Jobs with Justice to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 7, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 19.
246. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 18.
247. See Letter from Make the Road to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 3, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 34.
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WTPA changes the economic incentives that encourage bad-actor
employers to violate the law. . . . These new damages provide just that
leverage.”248
Finally, Governor David A. Paterson issued a strongly worded statement
approving the WTPA. Acknowledging concerns businesses and trade
associations expressed over the WTPA’s record-keeping and notice
requirements, he asserted that it was “crucial” to “move forward and carry
out the statute’s comprehensive and important mandate to protect workers’
rights . . . by deterring violations and by ensuring that employers who seek
to deny those rights are sanctioned.”249
One of the few cases examining the WTPA’s legislative history seized
upon such language of deterrence as proof of legislative intent to address
future violations, not to remedy past ones. In McLean v. Garage
Management Corp.,250 Judge Denise L. Cote found “no evidence of
legislative intent to apply the 100% liquidated damages amendment
retroactively.”251 Instead, Judge Cote observed that “the Sponsor’s
Memorandum suggests that the legislature intended to increase the NYLL’s
liquidated damages penalty to better deter future violations of the state’s
labor laws.”252
E. The NYLL’s New Prejudgment Interest Provision
The 2010 Amendment inserted into section 198(1-a) an explicit provision
for “prejudgment interest as required under the civil practice law and rules,”
in addition to liquidated damages.253 New York’s statutory prejudgment
interest rate is 9 percent per annum.254 The WTPA’s bill jacket says
nothing about this interest provision.255 Neither do floor debates about the
bill.256 The inclusion of such a provision conjures two alternative
interpretations of section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages. On one hand,
NYLL liquidated damages could be punitive in nature and simply
supplemented by a compensatory prejudgment interest award designed to
compensate employees for delay. On the other hand, the liquidated
248. Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010),
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 17–18; see also Introducer’s Memorandum in
Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 8 (“The penalties
currently in place for employers paying less than minimum wage are minimal and offer little
deterrent.”).
249. Governor’s Approval Memorandum (emphasis added), reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST.
LEGIS. ANN. 431.
250. No. 10 Civ. 3950, 2012 WL 1358739 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012).
251. Id. at *9.
252. Id. at *10 (emphasis added); see also supra note 212 and accompanying text.
253. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450.
254. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004 (McKinney 2007).
255. See generally N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564.
256. See N.Y. State Senate, Record of Proceedings 7508–12 (June 30, 2010) (Bill No.
8380); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 22–43 (Nov. 30, 2010) (Bill No.
11726); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 330–37 (July 1, 2010) (Bill No.
10163-B).
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damages and the prejudgment interest could both be compensatory. Such a
reading would not necessarily render either term superfluous.257 In the
latter scenario, prejudgment interest would guarantee employees a
minimum level of compensation should an employer establish the goodfaith defense and become excused from paying liquidated damages
altogether.
An analogous minimum recovery issue has sparked a split among circuit
courts interpreting § 216 of the FLSA. Generally, courts follow Brooklyn
Savings Bank and prohibit prejudgment interest in § 216 cases where the
maximum (100 percent) liquidated damages are awarded.258 Controversy
arises, however, when a court reduces or eliminates liquidated damages
pursuant to § 260.259 Some circuits, including the Second Circuit, have
concluded that employers who manage to avoid liquidated damages cannot
be assessed prejudgment interest on the back pay awards for which they
remain liable.260 In contrast, the majority of courts have distinguished
Brooklyn Savings Bank and awarded prejudgment interest when liquidated
damages are denied.261 Where partial liquidated damages are awarded,
their relationship to prejudgment interest has been “inadequately
explained.”262
Due to its silence, it is unclear whether the state legislature considered or
sought to avoid a similar quandary.
III. WADING THROUGH THE FLOODWATERS: WHY COURTS SHOULD
AWARD ONLY ONE SET OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Whether courts should award both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages
on the same underlying wage should not depend upon efforts to characterize
each award as “compensatory” or “punitive,” because such an approach
presumes that a single clear “purpose” or “nature” can be found.
Unfortunately, both the statutory text and the legislative history of section
198(1-a) send conflicting signals, suggesting a mixed purpose. Therefore,
courts should recognize that the provisions are nearly identical and serve
the same de facto purposes.
257. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 98 (McKinney 1971) (“All parts of a statute must be
harmonized with each other as well as with the general intent of the whole statute, and effect
and meaning must, if possible, be given to the entire statute and every part and word
thereof.”); In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (N.Y. 1996).
258. 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-166 to -167.
259. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-164.
260. See Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 1953) (agreeing
with Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1951), where the Third Circuit held
that there is “no in-between position consisting of unpaid wages plus interest. The claimant
gets liquidated damages for delay . . . or he gets nothing.”); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8,
at 18-164. But see Kadden v. VisuaLex, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4892, 2012 WL 5199369, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (awarding prejudgment interest although employer’s “good-faith
defense” avoided § 216(b) liquidated damages).
261. See 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-165 to -166.
262. Id. at 18-167; see also id. at 18-167 to -169 (discussing the various approaches to
prejudgment interest that courts take in partial liquidated damages scenarios).
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A. The State Statutory Text Does Not Express an Exclusively
Compensatory or Punitive Purpose
The statutory text sheds only a dim light upon legislative intent. First,
the state legislature’s characterization of the award as a “liquidated
damage” indicates a compensatory purpose. The dictionary definition of
“liquidated damages” suggests a compensatory function, because such
damages compensate for losses that are hard to estimate, calculate, or
prove.263 Nonetheless, the term “liquidated damages” is not always used
strictly according to its definition. For example, in Missel, Brooklyn
Savings Bank, Thurston, Schleier, Reilly, and Carter, courts required
extrinsic aids, like legislative history, to determine the respective purposes
Furthermore, other NYLL
of “liquidated damages” provisions.264
provisions specifically employ the term “penalty” instead of “liquidated
damages.”265 Such labels, however, do not necessarily govern intent.266
Second, the lack of a “willfulness” or another scienter requirement
indicates a compensatory purpose or at least the absence of a punitive one.
Original interpretations of the 1967 Version as punitive relied upon both the
willfulness requirement and the statute’s legislative history.267 Of course,
the state legislature removed section 198(1-a)’s willfulness requirement,268
and the 1967 Version’s legislative history is much less clear-cut than courts
have presented it to be.269 While the presence or absence of a willfulness or
a similar scienter requirement is not necessarily determinative, it is one of
the chief considerations in analyzing the nature of a statutory liquidated
damages provision.270 For example, the Supreme Court cited a willfulness
proviso as distinguishing the ADEA’s otherwise substantially identical
provision from the FLSA’s.271 Likewise, Carter decided that the 1967
Version’s liquidated damages served as a “penalty” for class-action
purposes, because only victims of “willful” violations would receive the
additional award—others would recover only their unpaid wages.272 Reilly,
following suit, also emphasized the willfulness requirement.273 Without
conditioning section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages upon culpability,
263. For definitions of “liquidated damages,” see supra notes 87–88, 107 and
accompanying text.
264. For discussions of these cases, see supra Parts I.C.2, I.C.3, II.B.
265. Compare, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 197, 198-a, 215, 662 (McKinney Supp. 2013),
with id. § 198(1-a).
266. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part I.C.3.
268. See supra notes 59, 178–80 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Parts I.C.3, II.A.
270. See supra Parts I.B.4, II.B.
271. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1995) (citing Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)); see also supra notes 183–95 and accompanying text.
272. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980),
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981).
273. See Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d, 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding
section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages provision is “to deter an employer’s willful
withholding of wages” (emphasis added)).
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violations resulting from negligence or even ignorance will trigger
liquidated damages.274 The inclusion of a good-faith defense does not
affect this analysis.275 Because of the amendments, the punishment is no
longer restricted to those who are blameworthy, and the deterrent is no
longer restricted to those who might consider wrongdoing, so the
provision’s punitive nature is diminished.
Finally, the prejudgment interest provision does not require section
198(1-a)’s liquidated damages to be punitive, because the provision could
be intended to ensure a minimum compensatory recovery, as previously
discussed.276
B. The State Legislative History Does Not Express an Exclusively
Compensatory or Punitive Purpose
Because the text expresses no clear compensatory or punitive purpose,
courts should turn to extrinsic materials for evidence of legislative intent.277
Regrettably, like the text, the legislative history provides no clear answer.
Instead, the legislative history sends conflicting signals. As illustrated
above in Part II, and as discussed below, some portions emphasize
compensating workers and conformity with the FLSA, while others focus
on deterring and punishing violations.
First, the 1967 Version’s legislative history contains numerous references
to compensation.278 Documents in the bill jacket suggest that the 25
percent liquidated damages the 1967 Version provided to employees were
intended to be simultaneously compensatory and punitive in nature.279
Memoranda from the bill’s sponsor, the governor, and the enforcing agency
all explicitly stated that the liquidated damages would compensate
employees for the consequences of employers’ violations.280 Their
unanimous concern over compensation makes sense. Low-wage workers
comprise an especially vulnerable demographic, and the impact of withheld
wages might be so severe and difficult to prove that ordinary prejudgment
interest would not provide sufficient remuneration for their unique
injuries.281 As previously discussed, providing an estimated award that
bypasses the need to prove special damages is exactly what “liquidated
damages” normally do.282 Indeed, such concerns underlie the FLSA’s
liquidated damages provision.283

274. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part II.E.
277. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing New York statutory construction).
278. See supra Part I.C.1.
279. See supra Part I.C.1.
280. See supra Part II.A.
281. See supra notes 22–23, 33, 207, 238 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 87–88, 107.
283. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707–08, 715–16 (1945); Overnight
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1942); supra Part I.C.2.
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At the very least, these sources demonstrate that prejudgment interest
would duplicate a portion, however small, of the 25 percent liquidated
damages, which, when awarded, were intended to compensate employees
for the delay in payment. Further, concluding that the 1967 Version
contained a compensatory element does not conflict with Carter, because
Carter did not rule out the possibility.284 The specific question of
prejudgment interest was not presented in Carter, and Carter did not hold
that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages are exclusively punitive.285 The
Supreme Court has indicated that statutory damages may serve multiple
purposes.286 Thus, to the extent that the 1967 Version’s legislative history
supports Reilly’s interpretation of Carter as standing for the proposition that
the liquidated damages are exclusively “punitive,” such an interpretation can
only survive in combination with the 1967 Version’s willfulness
requirement, which no longer exists.287
Rather, one of the reasons for amending section 198(1-a) was conformity
with the FLSA.288 Conformity entails bringing the two statutes into
agreement with one another. The 2009 Amendment’s legislative history
shows that interested parties, including the bill’s sponsor, contemplated
conformity with the FLSA as a goal, not simply a side effect.289 With
conformity as a goal, it would be unlikely that the drafters intended for
plaintiffs to receive two sets of liquidated damages. Otherwise, whether or
not the state provision “conforms” to its federal counterpart would be
irrelevant—a plaintiff could recover under both statutes regardless of
conformity.
If, however, the legislators intended to provide state
protections as an alternative to those under federal law, then it seems likely
that they would be very much concerned with having the NYLL “conform”
to the FLSA, which provides compensatory liquidated damages.290 Indeed,
by removing the willfulness requirement, the legislature eased the
employee’s evidentiary burdens.
This change was remedial, not
prophylactic, because employees find themselves in the courtroom only
after wage and hour violations have already occurred.291
It is clear, however, that the 2010 Amendment’s primary purposes were
deterrence and retribution. Assorted memoranda supporting the bill,
including the sponsor’s and the governor’s, consistently expressed such
284. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116–17 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980),
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981).
285. See id.; supra Part I.C.3.
286. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); see also supra
notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
287. Reilly specifically states that the purpose of the state’s liquidated damages provision
is “to deter” a “willful withholding” of wages. Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d
253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999).
288. See supra Part II.C.
289. See id.
290. See supra Part I.C.2.
291. One might argue that the burden shift decreases the likelihood that an employer will
escape liability for liquidated damages and consequently strengthens deterrence. The 2009
Amendment’s legislative history, however, does not support this argument.
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sentiments.292 The WTPA finally upped the ante after New York spent
decades under an ineffective enforcement system.293
Since the 2010 Amendment increased liquidated damages from 25
percent to 100 percent, it would be reasonable to conclude that the
difference is punitive. Dissecting the liquidated damages award, however,
would still leave the remaining 25 percent undefined and lead to
complicated calculations, essentially defeating the very utility of a
“liquidated” award. Permitting the punitive purposes of the increase to
overwhelm the mixed purposes of the original award is also
unacceptable.294
C. The Federal and State Liquidated Damages Provisions Overlap
Neither the statutory text nor the legislative history unambiguously points
towards either an exclusively compensatory or punitive purpose. Therefore,
courts have a couple of options. First, they could, and should, recognize the
fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state
legislation. Upon doing so, they should award only one set of liquidated
damages to avoid duplicating the portion of state liquidated damages,
whatever that portion might be, which the legislature deemed appropriate
compensation for the harms of wage underpayment. Alternatively, courts
confronting demands for both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages on the
same underlying wage could adopt a practical approach, under which they
should also award one set of liquidated damages.
Under the current statutory scheme, it does not matter whether section
198(1-a)’s liquidated damages are exclusively compensatory, punitive, or
both.
First, if the NYLL’s liquidated damages are exclusively
compensatory, the double recovery doctrine obviously would prohibit
combining them with the FLSA’s liquidated damages. Similarly, if the
NYLL’s liquidated damages are both compensatory and punitive, then
combining them with the FLSA’s liquidated damages would duplicate the
compensatory aspect of the state award. Finally, even if the NYLL’s
liquidated damages are exclusively punitive, the double recovery doctrine
would still prohibit their combination with the FLSA’s, because the NYLL
already provides plaintiffs a compensatory remedy for delay in the form of
prejudgment interest.295 Prejudgment interest is a compensatory award for
the delayed use of money.296 Thus, awards under both the FLSA and the
NYLL would overlap, because the FLSA’s liquidated damages are designed
292. See supra Part II.D.
293. See id.
294. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 192 (McKinney 1971) (“An amendatory act and the original
statute are to be construed together, and the original act and the amendments are viewed as
one law passed at the same time.”).
295. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 2013); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
5004 (McKinney 2007).
296. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text (discussing the compensatory nature
of prejudgment interest).
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to compensate employees for a host of injuries associated with untimely
payments, including the delayed use of money.297 Employees cannot
receive duplicative awards for delay. Accordingly, courts should award
only NYLL damages, because they provide a greater payout.298
Dodging the question of “purpose” or “nature” in this manner might
provide only temporary reprieve, as the legislature could remove the
NYLL’s prejudgment interest provision. Further, it would certainly be
ironic if adding state prejudgment interest to state liquidated damages, for a
minimum of 109 percent of unpaid wages, prevented the combination of
FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages, which would amount to 200 percent
of unpaid wages. Indeed, 100 percent plus interest will almost always be
less than the 125 percent combined award, which some courts had awarded
under the 1967 Version.299
If determining the purpose or nature of section 198(1-a) remains a
relevant objective, it is important to remember that, despite all of the saber
rattling about cracking down on “wage theft,” the 2010 Amendment merely
put section 198(1-a) on par with its federal counterpart. Although the 2010
Amendment took a giant leap forward by quadrupling state liquidated
damages, employers had already faced the threat of 100 percent liquidated
damages under the FLSA for over seventy years, and the state’s failure to
enact stronger provisions illustrates a reluctance to “get tough.”300

297. See supra Part I.C.2.
298. In addition to the underpaid wages, the NYLL awards an additional 100 percent as
liquidated damages plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum. See N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (authorizing 100 percent liquidated damages plus prejudgment
interest); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004 (specifying prejudgment interest rate of 9 percent per annum).
In contrast, the FLSA awards only an additional 100 percent as liquidated damages. See 29
U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing 100 percent liquidated damages); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil,
324 U.S. 697, 715–16 (1945) (prohibiting the combination of prejudgment interest and § 216
liquidated damages); see also 29 U.S.C. § 218 (governing the FLSA’s relation to other laws).
299. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004; see also supra notes 162–63
and accompanying text (discussing the intracircuit split regarding interpretations of the 1967
Version). Under the NYLL, liquidated damages plus interest would amount to 109 percent
of unpaid wages one year overdue, 118 percent of those two years overdue, and 127 percent
of those three years overdue. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004; see also
supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (explaining that the federal and state statutes
overlap for a maximum of three years due to the applicable limitations periods).
300. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); see also supra
Part I.A.1 (discussing the FLSA’s enactment in 1938). A number of other states award 200
percent liquidated damages. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-355 (2012) (“[T]he
employee may recover in a civil action against an employer or former employer an amount
that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150
(LexisNexis 2008) (authorizing “treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages
and other benefits”). New York’s legislature considered but did not adopt a similar
provision. In July 2010, the New York State Assembly passed a 200 percent liquidated
damages provision in its version of the WTPA. See Assemb. B. 10163-B, § 8, 233d Sess.
(N.Y. 2010). Subsequently, however, the Assembly abandoned that provision in favor of a
100 percent liquidated damages provision when it adopted the New York State Senate’s
version of the WTPA instead. See Assemb. B. 11726, § 7, 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (same as
S.B. 8380, 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010)); see also N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings
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Since the state legislature was aware of the existing federal scheme,
another relevant question is whether it intended to provide an additional or
alternative award. Through the NYLL, the state legislature has constructed
a comprehensive statutory scheme that both compensates victims when
wage underpayment occurs and punishes and deters violators.301 In
addition to liquidated damages, its myriad other mechanisms for
punishment and deterrence include the specter of large civil penalties,
criminal fines, and even imprisonment.302 Liquidated damages differ
because they impact employees’ pockets, not the state’s. Therefore, like the
FLSA, the NYLL incentivizes private enforcement, saving the government
money.303
The parallels between the state and federal schemes support the
conclusion that the NYLL’s liquidated damages are an alternative to the
FLSA’s. As a deterrent, section 198(1-a)’s provisions are no more
persuasive than the FLSA’s, and as a punishment, they are no more
painful.304 Both statutes address the same harm, provide employees the
same remedy, and grant employers essentially the same defense.305
Without compelling contrary evidence, awarding liquidated damages under
both statutes on the same underlying wage constitutes a double recovery
that courts should avoid.
CONCLUSION
Courts facing demands for liquidated damages under both the FLSA and
the NYLL should not award them under both statutes. In light of the
conflicting textual and historical evidence, a dichotomous approach or a
“judgment call” choosing one purpose over the other would disregard the
fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state
legislation. NYLL liquidated damages should be recognized for what they
are—both compensatory and punitive in nature. Consequently, courts can
only avoid double recovery by awarding liquidated damages under one
statute.

23–24 (Nov. 30, 2010) (Bill No. 11726) (remarks of Assemb. Carl E. Heastie) (explaining
that the Senate’s version provided lower liquidated damages than Assembly’s version).
301. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN.
431 (describing the WTPA as “comprehensive and expansive”); Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub
& Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1993) (observing that the 1967 Version provides
“cumulative remedies for wage claims brought thereunder”).
302. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 197, 198, 198-a, 215, 662, 663.
303. See supra notes 93, 103 and accompanying text.
304. New York’s prohibition of class recovery further dulls the pain of § 198(1-a)’s
liquidated damages. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST.
LEGIS. ANN. 428–31 (explaining that provisions that would have removed N.Y. C.P.L.R
901(b)’s prohibition on class recovery were removed from the WTPA); see also supra note
98 and accompanying text (briefly discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R 901(b)). On the other hand,
New York has a longer statute of limitations than the FLSA does. See supra notes 64–65 and
accompanying text.
305. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a).

